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Death by Arugula: How Soil Contamination 
Stunts Urban Agriculture, and What the Law 
Should Do About It 
Steven A. Platt*
Interest in backyard and community gardens has grown in 
recent years as people increasingly consider what food they eat, 
where it comes from, and how it is transported to their local 
market.
 
1 Almost 250 million people in the United States now 
live in urban areas,2 so a large percentage of the people in this 
country stand to benefit from establishing an urban garden. In 
fact, fifteen percent of the world’s food is grown in urban areas,3
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millennium. More generally, I give sincere thanks to all of my family and 
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and as many as 18,000 community gardens may be operating 
 1. See STEVE MARTINEZ ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC RE-
SEARCH REPORT NO. 97, LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS, IMPACTS, AND IS-
SUES iii–v (2010); Adrian Higgins, Squeezed for Space in the City, Green 
Thumbs Get Inventive, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at H1; see also Erin A. Wil-
liamson, A Deeper Ecology: Community Gardens in the Urban Environment 
5–16 (Sept. 30, 2002) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Delaware), 
available at http://www.cityfarmer.org/AP-city_farmer.doc (exploring the dif-
ferent contexts in which American urban agriculture has historically arisen). 
 2. 2010 Census Urban Area FAQs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www 
.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafaq.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2013). 
 3. Urban Agriculture, NAT’L AGRIC. LIBRARY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://afsic.nal.usda.gov/farms-and-community/urban-agriculture (last updat-
ed Mar. 8, 2013). 
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nationwide.4 However, arable land is rare in urban areas, so 
potential gardeners are often left with sites adjacent to, or pre-
viously occupied by, industrial and commercial enterprises.5 
Those properties can present serious health concerns because 
their soil often contains industrial or urban pollutants well in 
excess of natural levels.6 For example, the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Agency considers over half of the City of Chica-
go’s land area to be contaminated.7 Some organizations cite soil 
contamination as their biggest concern with urban farming.8
Soil contamination poses very real dangers to human 
health. City of Montreal toxicologists recently shut down 167 
community garden plots for having impermissibly high levels of 
soil contamination.
 
9 In suburban San Francisco, residents liv-
ing next to a Superfund site have experienced skins rashes, 
bloodshot eyes, vomiting, and miscarriages for years.10 There, 
neighbor Basilia de Guzman believes that regularly eating veg-
etables grown in her backyard has caused many of her family’s 
health problems.11
 
 4. PETER HARNIK, URBAN GREEN: INNOVATIVE PARKS FOR RESURGENT 
CITIES 83 (2010). 
 Ms. de Guzman and her neighbors filed a 
 5. Jon Hurdle, Where Industry Once Hummed, Urban Garden Finds Suc-
cess, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2008, at A18. 
 6. Joel B. Eisen, “Brownfields of Dreams”?: Challenges and Limits of 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 890–93, 
895. For a discussion of why American soil is contaminated, see John E. Mogk 
et al., Promoting Urban Agriculture as an Alternative Land Use for Vacant 
Properties in the City of Detroit: Benefits, Problems and Proposals for a Regu-
latory Framework for Successful Land Use Integration, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 
1521, 1537 (2010) (pinpointing contamination sources as “demolished build-
ings, emissions from lead-based gasoline engines, and airborne lead contami-
nants from [cities’] industry”). 
 7. Matthew D. Fortney, Comment, Devolving Control over Mildly Con-
taminated Property: The Local Cleanup Program, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1863, 
1864 n.8 (2006) (citing data from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agen-
cy). 
 8. E.g., Petti Fong, Parking Lot Gets Green Makeover, TORONTO STAR, 
Sept. 2, 2012, at IN1, available at 2012 WLNR 18669199. 
 9. Jason Magder, Borough Closes 167 Garden Plots, MONTREAL GA-
ZETTE, Apr. 1, 2008, at A6. The city’s Department of Public Health insists, 
however, that the closures were merely precautionary. Id. But see Op-Ed., End 
Secrecy on Contaminated Plots, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Apr. 30, 2007, at A16 
(“[If] there is ‘no immediate danger’ to public health, . . . why close any sites? 
This is an incoherent position.”). 
 10. Angelica Pence, Living on Toxic Ground: After 10-Year Battle, Daly 
City Residents Finally Being Heard, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 20, 2000, at A1. 
 11. See id. (noting that Ms. de Guzman switched to gardening in plant-
ers).  
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$125 million class-action suit against the federal government, 
which previously owned the land, but the suit was dismissed on 
summary judgment.12 A later class action filed by 195 neigh-
borhood residents against the County and the utility company 
that operated on the site before the federal government owned 
it was similarly unsuccessful.13 County health officials now in-
struct neighborhood gardeners to wear protective gloves and 
avoid contact with the soil.14
Individuals and society at large stand to reap enough bene-
fits from urban agriculture that policymakers should consider 
how to address unhealthy soil contamination. Yet federal, 
state, and local governments currently present an uncoordinat-
ed patchwork of standards and guidelines with regard to moni-
toring urban soil quality and mitigating contaminated soil for 
urban gardens.
 
15 The relevant regulatory agencies are author-
ized to intervene to remediate properties, but the procedures 
for doing so are cumbersome and costly.16 These agencies have 
enforcement discretion, and will rarely intervene on behalf of 
lesser-contaminated properties; not every urban residential 
backyard is a Love Canal.17 The lack of easy and inexpensive 
remedies for many segments of the population imperils the re-
cent surge of interest in urban agriculture.18
 
 12. Laurence v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1445, 1448, 1452, 1453 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Laurence v. Dep’t of the Navy, 59 F.3d 112 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 As one nonprofit 
director put it, “In many cases, individuals and families are a 
 13. Laurence v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. A080941 (Cal. Ct. App. May 15, 
2000). 
 14. Angelica Pence, Toxic Takeout: Ridding Midway Village of Tainted 
Soil—Again, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2001, at A13. 
 15. See infra Part I.B–D. 
 16. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 17. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Company 
disposed toxic chemical wastes into Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York. 
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 997–98 
(W.D.N.Y. 1994). Over the next few decades, chemical residues began surfac-
ing and seeping into neighboring homes, leading New York to declare a State 
Health Emergency in 1978. Id. at 998. The ensuing outcry spurred Congress to 
pass the federal Superfund law in 1980. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Occidental to Pay $129 Million in Love Canal Settlement (Dec. 21, 1995) (on 
file with author); see Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). The U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency cleaned the area and later recovered $129 mil-
lion in restitution from Hooker. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra 
note 17. 
 18. See infra Part II.A–B. 
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little bit ahead of the policymakers in terms of understanding 
just how important [urban agriculture] is.”19
Meanwhile, private parties have benefited from hazardous 
substance reimbursement funds available in other contexts, no-
tably for underground petroleum storage tank leakages and 
fertilizer and pesticide contamination.
 
20 Implementing such a 
fund for urban agriculture could effectuate healthy, contami-
nant-free community gardens for more urban dwellers.21
This Note discusses the magnitude of the issue of soil con-
tamination in community gardens, and how a reimbursement 
fund tailored to urban farming would resolve many of the 
shortcomings inherent in current legal approaches. Part I pro-
vides an overview of urban gardens and soil contamination, 
how individuals can address soil contamination outside the le-
gal sphere, and what laws currently regulate community gar-
den pollution, such as environmental torts and remedial stat-
utes. This Part also comparatively describes various 
jurisdictions’ funds that reimburse private parties for out-of-
pocket soil remediation costs. Part II explains the various defi-
ciencies in legal responses to identified soil contamination, and 
how other private party reimbursement funds fare more suc-
cessfully in other contamination situations. Finally, Part III 
recommends that governments close the gap in regulating soil 
contamination by creating a small-scale urban agriculture re-
imbursement account and building on the lessons and best 
practices of other hazardous substance funds. 
 
I.  THE RISE OF URBAN AGRICULTURE, THE NATURE OF 
SOIL CONTAMINATION, AND THE LAW’S RELATIONSHIP 
WITH BOTH   
Urban agriculture provides a wide spectrum of benefits, 
both for individuals, such as increased access to inexpensive 
fresh food, and for communities, such as the increased economic 
activity associated with more gardening. This Part discusses 
many of the practice’s innumerable benefits, and further exam-
ines soil contamination and how it compromises these benefits. 
Next, this Part examines how gardeners can address soil con-
tamination: on their own, through grants, and through litiga-
 
 19. Morning Edition: Not All Communities Welcome Urban Gardening 
(National Public Radio broadcast Aug. 10, 2009) (quoting Roger Doiron, the 
director of a nonprofit promoting local food). 
 20. See infra Part II.C. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
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tion predicated on statutory and common law causes of action. 
Then, it looks at state trust funds that actually reimburse pri-
vate parties for remediating their soil in certain situations. 
A. WHY URBAN AGRICULTURE AND SOIL CONTAMINATION 
DESERVE LEGAL ATTENTION 
Urban agriculture is generally the practice of growing pro-
duce or herbs in a small-scale urban or suburban setting,22 and 
comprises single-user, residential vegetable gardens as well as 
entrepreneurial community farms.23 The benefits of urban agri-
culture are enjoyed by both individuals specifically and society 
generally. The fresh and healthy food available from backyard 
and community gardens combats malnutrition, obesity, fatigue, 
and depression.24 Unlike industrially produced food, food grown 
in backyards or on nearby plots does not have to travel over 
great distances, so consumers know the source of their food and 
what went into growing it.25 Producing food locally reduces 
packing, refrigeration, storage, and transportation needs, 
which in turn lowers the energy costs and usage inherent in 
food production.26 Urban gardens create social,27 educational,28
 
 22. See JAC SMIT ET AL., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, URBAN AG-
RICULTURE: FOOD, JOBS AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES ch. 1, at 1–2 (2001 ed.). 
More specifically, it encompasses “any processes that produce traditional sub-
sistence, nutritional or commercially profitable food or other grown or raised 
products, removed from rural domains, and instead cultivate them in special 
intensive conditions within the urban context or in its surrounding buffer, pe-
ri-urban, regions.” CHARLES W. LESHER JR., URBAN AGRICULTURE: A LITERA-
TURE REVIEW 5 (2006), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/10244232/ 
Urban-Agriculture. 
 
 23. Dana May Christensen, Securing the Momentum: Could a Homestead 
Act Help Sustain Detroit Urban Agriculture?, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 241, 245 
(2011). The most common form of urban agriculture in the United States is the 
community garden: a “neighborhood garden in which individuals have their 
own plots yet share in the garden’s overall management.” Dorothy A. Borrelli, 
Filling the Void: Applying a Place-Based Ethic to Community Gardens, 9 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 271, 273 (2008) (quoting LAURA LAWSON, CITY BEAUTIFUL: A CEN-
TURY OF COMMUNITY GARDENING IN AMERICA 3 (2005)). This Note uses the 
terms “urban agriculture” and “community gardens” interchangeably, as the 
problem of soil contamination affects both equally. 
 24. Kathryn A. Peters, Note, Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture 
Revolution, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 203, 215 (2010). 
 25. See Daniele Giovannucci et al., Defining and Marketing “Local” Foods: 
Geographical Indications for U.S. Products, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 94, 99 
(2010) (explaining that consumers have difficulty making informed choices 
when “agricultural processes are located elsewhere”).  
 26. Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1534. 
 27. See WCCO 4 News at 10 (WCCO-TV television broadcast Mar. 31, 
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and employment opportunities,29 and they may increase the 
value of nearby properties30—as much as 9.4% in some impov-
erished neighborhoods.31 Investment in urban farms benefits 
the local economy by having a significant multiplier effect;32 one 
report estimates that every dollar invested in urban gardens 
yields six dollars’ worth of vegetables.33 Urban agriculture can 
moderate food insecurity, which stems from such threats as 
climate change and terrorist attacks.34 The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture reported that 14.9% of all American households 
were “food insecure” at some point in 2011, compared with 
14.7% in 2009.35 Finally, urban agriculture revitalizes neigh-
borhoods by putting abandoned land to a productive use.36 This 
blight reduction in turn suppresses crime and reduces munici-
pal police and maintenance expenses.37
Contaminated soil can reduce or eliminate all of these ben-
efits. Urban soil in particular is at a heightened risk of contam-
 For all of these reasons, 
governments should actively encourage urban gardening. 
 
2012), available at http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/03/31/mound-church 
-helps-low-income-families-grow-food/ (“[P]eople just wanted to feel more con-
nected to the communities where they are from and where their food comes 
from. It’s something that we really lost along the way.” (quoting a community 
gardening organization outreach coordinator)). 
 28. SMIT ET AL., supra note 22, at ch. 7, at 3 (reasoning that urban agri-
culture frees up household income, allowing for more education expenditures). 
 29. Borrelli, supra note 23, at 276. 
 30. Ioan Voicu & Vicki Been, The Effect of Community Gardens on Neigh-
boring Property Values, 36 REAL EST. ECON. 241, 241–43 (2008) (finding that 
community gardens have a statistically significant positive impact on property 
values within 1000 feet of the garden). 
 31. Id. at 277. 
 32. See SMIT ET AL., supra note 22, at ch. 7, at 15 (discussing the economic 
benefits of urban agriculture in several countries); Mogk et al., supra note 6, 
at 1531. 
 33. Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1531. 
 34. Kate H. Brown & Andrew L. Jameton, Public Health Implications of 
Urban Agriculture, 21 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 20, 24–26 (2000); Melanie J. 
Duda, Note, Growing in the D: Revising Current Laws to Promote a Model of 
Sustainable City Agriculture, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2012). 
 35. ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RE-
SEARCH SERV., ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT NO. 141, HOUSEHOLD FOOD SE-
CURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2011, at 4 (2012), available at http://www 
.ers.usda.gov/media/884525/err141.pdf; MARK NORD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT NO. 108, 
HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 4 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/122550/err108_1_.pdf. 
 36. Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1523–24. 
 37. Id. at 1534. 
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ination exceeding natural levels because of past industrial us-
es.38 Toxic amounts of herbicides, pesticides, petroleum hydro-
carbons, solvents, and heavy metals commonly saturate urban 
soil.39
Even though symptoms may not be immediately present, 
exposure to impacted soil can be a serious health risk.
  
40 Many 
compounds poison insidiously, and their effects on human 
health may take years to manifest.41 For instance, lead per-
vades much urban soil.42 Lead poisoning is the most common 
environmental disease of young children, constituting a “silent 
epidemic.”43 Similarly, the effects of arsenicosis—arsenic poi-
soning—can take anywhere from five to twenty years to devel-
op.44 Often, symptoms do not arise until after the hazards’ im-
pact has become irreversible.45 Of course, it is very difficult to 
predict the extent to which an individual will develop symp-
toms, if at all, from environmental exposure.46
 
 38. Allison Houlihan Turner, Urban Agriculture and Soil Contamination: 
An Introduction to Urban Gardening, UNIV. OF LOUISVILLE, ENVTL. FIN. CTR. 
2 (2009), http://louisville.edu/cepm/publications/practice-guides-1/PG25%20 
-%20Urban%20Agriculture%20-%20Soil%20Contamination.pdf/at_download/ 
file; see also Mogk et al., supra note 
 Still, the threat 
6, at 1537 (discussing high levels of lead in 
soil in large cities across the United States). 
 39. Turner, supra note 38, at 1–2. While it is true that herbicides and pes-
ticides can be safely used for agricultural purposes, in large amounts they are 
unhealthy. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 208, 224–30, 237 (1962). 
 40. The chemicals commonly found in soil can cause anything from skin 
cancer (from arsenic) to nausea and partial paralysis (from the pesticide DDT). 
See DDT Health and Safety Update, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK 
SERV. 1–3 (Dec. 2000), http://www.nps.gov/museum/publications/ 
conserveogram/02-14.pdf; Hazards of Short-Term Exposure to Arsenic-
Contaminated Soil, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF ENVTL. 
HEALTH ASSESSMENT SERVS. 2, 5–6 (Jan. 1999), http://www.doh.wa.gov/ 
Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/334-284.pdf. 
 41. See Gitanjali Nain Gill, A Green Tribunal for India, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 
461, 470 (2010) (citing data from the World Health Organization). 
 42. Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1537; Felicity Barringer, To Nullify Lead, 
Add a Bunch of Fish Bones, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at A12. 
 43. Lead Poisoning: Hearings on H.R. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on 
Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong. 1, 195 
(1992). 
 44. Gill, supra note 41, at 470. 
 45. See Daniel A. Okun, Drinking Water and Public Health Protection, in 
DRINKING WATER REGULATION AND HEALTH 17–18 (Frederick W. Pontius ed., 
2003) (discussing this eventuality with water contamination). 
 46. See Steve C. Gold, The “Reshapement” of the False Negative Asym-
metry in Toxic Tort Causation, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1507, 1510–11 
(2011) (noting the unique difficulties of proving causation in toxic tort suits); 
Ken Sexton et al., Estimating Exposure and Dose to Characterize Health Risks: 
The Role of Human Tissue Monitoring in Exposure Assessment, 103 ENVTL. 
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is substantial enough that as the public sector aims to encour-
age urban gardening, it should also consider how to help miti-
gate the health problems that can develop as a result of con-
taminated soil.  
B. HOW GARDENERS CAN ADDRESS SOIL CONTAMINATION 
OUTSIDE THE LAW 
Obviously, prospective gardeners have ways to remediate 
contaminated soil without legal redress. Cleaning contaminat-
ed realty requires two distinct actions: assessment and remedi-
ation. Once gardeners test their soil and discover contamina-
tion,47 they can treat it in many different ways. Common 
remediation methods include building raised beds that physi-
cally separate impacted soil from clean, imported soil,48 using 
soil amendments to stabilize contaminants in soil,49 and remov-
ing all contaminated soil and replacing it with clean soil.50 More 
innovative but less common techniques include using ground-
up fish bones to reduce the amount of lead in the soil51 and phy-
toremediation, which uses non-edible plants such as willows to 
degrade or extract contaminants from the soil.52 Many agencies 
provide private citizens and organizations with information on 
how to alleviate soil quality issues on their own.53
 
HEALTH PERSP. (SUPPLEMENT 3) 13, 13 (1995) (“[E]nvironmentally induced 
chronic disease is highly complex: multiple exposures and causative agents, 
long latency periods, and variability within and among individuals must be 
considered.”). 
 
 47. See, e.g., Manjula Nathan, Soil Testing for Lead for Garden and Land-
scape Soils, MO. ENV’T & GARDEN (Apr. 1, 2009), http://ipm.missouri.edu/ 
MEG/2009/4/Soil-Testing-for-Lead-for-Garden-and-Landscape-Soils/. 
 48. Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1536–37. 
 49. See generally Engracia Madejón et al., Soil Amendments Reduce Trace 
Element Solubility in a Contaminated Soil and Allow Regrowth of Natural 
Vegetation, 139 ENVTL. POLLUTION 40 (2006) (discussing the positive effects of 
three soil amendments on soil chemical properties and vegetation). 
 50. Reusing Potentially Contaminated Landscapes: Growing Gardens in 
Urban Soils, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Spring 2011), http://nepis.epa.gov/ 
Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100AV48.PDF. 
 51. Barringer, supra note 42, at A12. 
 52. See Ute Krämer, Phytoremediation: Novel Approaches to Cleaning up 
Polluted Soils, 16 CURRENT OPINION BIOTECHNOLOGY 133, 133–34 (2005) (dis-
cussing this method). 
 53. See, e.g., SoilFacts: Minimizing Risks of Soil Contaminants in Urban 
Gardens, N.C. COOP. EXTENSION SERV. (Jan. 2012), http://www.soil.ncsu.edu/ 
publications/Soilfacts/AG-439-78_Urban_Soil_Contaminants.pdf. 
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C. GOVERNMENT LOANS AND GRANTS FOR SOIL ASSESSMENT 
AND REMEDIATION 
Government involvement in urban agriculture is hardly 
novel. The government has long involved itself in, and fostered 
an enthusiasm for, urban farming.54 For example, during the 
two World Wars the federal government aggressively encour-
aged urban and suburban residents to grow their own food.55 
The ensuing victory gardens contributed roughly forty percent 
of all fresh vegetables consumed in the United States in 1942 
and 1943.56 Today, many jurisdictions expressly consider urban 
agriculture through zoning codes57 or programs designed to in-
crease awareness of locally growing foods.58 More generally, the 
government greatly influences America’s relationship with food 
through its subsidies, food safety laws, nutritional standards, 
and myriad regulations.59
Agencies at all levels of government offer grants to assess 
and clean up properties, especially brownfields.
 
60 Brownfields 
are abandoned or underused properties containing, or perceived 
as containing, hazardous substances. This actual or seeming 
contamination very often complicates a property’s gardening 
potential.61 The federal government estimates there may be as 
many as half a million brownfields in this country, although 
the exact number is unknown.62
 
 54. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96 (McKinney 1986) (authorizing mu-
nicipalities to hold land for individuals and community organizations and to 
assist in the development of community gardens by contributing initial site 
preparation and materials such as soil, compost, seeds, and tools). 
 
 55. Clive Thompson, Grow Your Own, WIRED, Sept. 2008, at 56, 56. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO CODE OF ORDINANCES § 336.01 (effective 
Mar. 9, 2007) (adopting a zoning classification for urban garden districts). 
 58. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 93.45 (West 2012) (directing the state De-
partment of Agriculture to “conduct a program to increase awareness and con-
sumption of locally produced foods”). 
 59. David Burnett, Note, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: 
Critiquing Congress’s Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 357, 373–74 (2007). 
 60. Brownfields and Land Revitalization: Grants & Funding, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.gov/brownfields/grant_info/index.htm (last updated 
Aug. 15, 2012). See generally Julianne Kurdila & Elise Rindfleisch, Funding 
Opportunities for Brownfield Redevelopment, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 
(2007) (identifying funding opportunities for brownfield development general-
ly, though most of the identified sources only apply to redevelopment for for-
profit uses). 
 61. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006). 
 62. JUSTIN B. HOLLANDER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BROWNFIELD REGENER-
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) antici-
pates awarding $14 million in seventy-three remediation 
grants in fiscal year 2013.63 However, these grants are availa-
ble only to governments, tribes, and nonprofits.64 The EPA is 
even more parsimonious with assessment grants, dispersing 
them to governments, tribes, and chartered or sanctioned rede-
velopment agencies only.65 Eligible sites are defined as any 
brownfield, using the expansive definition above.66 The federal 
government awards grants in more specific situations; one U.S. 
Department of Agriculture initiative pertains only to communi-
ty gardens at eligible high-poverty schools.67
At the state level, an exemplary program for assessing soil 
contamination is the Minnesota Targeted Brownfield Assess-
ment Program.
 
68 The program assists individuals and organiza-
tions in redeveloping brownfields into urban gardens, and pro-
vides technical advice and assistance with developing a work 
plan.69
The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality admin-
isters a typical state cleanup financing program. In Oregon, 
any person may apply for a loan or grant from the Oregon 
Brownfields Redevelopment Fund, and an organization may 





ATION: CLEANUP, DESIGN, AND REUSE OF DERELICT LAND 4 (2010). Others es-
timate the number could be as high as one million. Scott W. Brunner, Note, 
Sharing the Green: Reformatting Wisconsin’s Forgotten Green Space Grant 
with a Public-Private Partnership Design, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 307 (2011). 
 The state’s two brownfields funds give money to en-
 63. FY13 Guidelines for Brownfields Cleanup Grants, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr-12-09.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 64. Id. 
 65. FY13 Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment Grants, U.S. ENVT’L 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr-12-07.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 9406(k)(3). 
 67. People’s Garden School Pilot Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
GRANTS.GOV (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.grants.gov/search/search.do?mode= 
VIEW&oppId=56501. 
 68. Minnesota Targeted Brownfield Assessment Program, MINN. POLLU-
TION CONTROL AGENCY (Sept. 2010), http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/ 
view-document.html?gid=2418. 
 69. Id. 
 70. OR. ADMIN. R. 123-135-0030(1) (2001); OR. ADMIN. R. 123-140-
0030(1)–(2) (2010). 
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vironmental actions for “site redevelopment that facilitates 
economic development or community revitalization.”71
D. CAUSES OF ACTION FOR REDRESS OF SOIL CONTAMINATION 
FOR URBAN AGRICULTURE 
 
Soil contamination in urban agriculture reaches several 
areas of the law, including environmental law, property law, 
and tort law.72
1. Classic Environmental Tort and Contract Claims Can 
Apply to Urban Gardens 
 Courts and legislatures have not specifically 
crafted urban agriculture-specific remedies, but litigants have 
sometimes succeeded in bringing actions for contaminated soil 
in general on these common law theories. Usually, an aggrieved 
grower will have suffered at least injury to property—that is, 
the contamination thwarts a productive garden, thereby reduc-
ing the land’s value—but might also have suffered injury to 
person—that is, enjoying the contaminated garden caused det-
riment to personal health. 
Private parties have legally addressed contaminated soil 
by suing responsible polluting parties directly under the com-
mon law. The availability and effectiveness of this remedy var-
ies widely across jurisdictions, but applicable torts often in-
clude trespass,73 nuisance,74 strict liability,75 and negligence;76
 
 71. Brownfields, BUS. OR., http://www.oregon4biz.com/Business-financing 
-resources/Oregon-Finance-Programs/Brownfields-Redevelopment-Fund/ (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2013); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 285A.188(3)(b)(B)(ii) 
(West 2012) (requiring that the “environmental action provide[] a substantial 
public benefit”). 
 
 72. For a discussion of other legal issues relating to urban gardens not 
involving soil contamination, see generally Jane E. Schukoske, Community 
Development Through Gardening: State and Local Policies Transforming Ur-
ban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (2000) (tax law, nonprof-
it law, liability concerns, and basic property law) and Megha Satyanarayana, 
Oak Park Family in Hubbub over Garden to Leave State, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, Aug. 25, 2011, at A10 (city ordinances). 
 73. See, e.g., In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 909 F. Supp. 991, 996 
(D.V.I. 1995) (finding that for nuisance claims in the environmental contami-
nation context, “interference with one’s use or enjoyment of his land may, but 
need not, arise from a physical harm or invasion to that land”).  
 74. See, e.g., Hoery v. United States, 324 F.3d 1220, 1221–22 (10th Cir. 
2003) (finding the federal government liable for nuisance and continuing tres-
pass for negligently releasing toxic chemicals into the ground that had migrat-
ed onto the plaintiff’s property); see also Douglas F. Gansler, Protecting Mary-
land’s Environment: A Holistic Solution, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 205, 218–22 (2010) 
(arguing the tort of nuisance fills a regulatory gap in the enforcement of envi-
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less common are emotional distress77 and medical monitoring.78 
Contractual claims79 and causes of action based on disclosure 
laws80
 
ronmental law). The theories of trespass and nuisance are closely related but 
distinct: “A trespass is a direct infringement of another’s right of possession. 
Where there is no physical invasion of property, as with intangible intrusions 
such as noise and odor, the cause of action is for nuisance rather than for tres-
pass.” Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964, 971 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
 can also be effective against sellers or lessors who fail to 
inform their buyers or tenants of soil contamination under dis-
closure laws. For example, a gardener may sue for fraud if a 
 75. See, e.g., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 
(N.J. 1983) (“[M]ercury and other toxic wastes are ‘abnormally dangerous,’ and 
the disposal of them, past or present, is an abnormally dangerous activity.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Kosmacek v. Farm Serv. Co-op of Persia, 485 N.W.2d 99, 
100–01 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (affirming a trial court’s award of damages when 
defendants negligently allowed herbicide tanks to overflow into plaintiff’s 
property). 
 77. See, e.g., Johnson v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 975 So. 2d 698, 711–12 
(La. Ct. App. 2008) (noting damages can be awarded for emotional distress 
“caused not by the usual worry or anxiety associated with property damage, 
but legitimate concern about health effects,” to plaintiffs that had purchased 
land the sellers did not disclose was the site of a closed toxic landfill). But see 
Kane v. Cameron Int’l Corp., 331 S.W.3d 145, 149–50 (Tex. App. 2011) (reject-
ing a claim for “fear of dreaded disease” where the defendant’s release of toxic 
chemicals allegedly caused cancer, because Texas does not recognize a claim 
for fear of developing a disease). 
 78. See, e.g., Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army & Dep’t of 
Def., 696 A.2d 137, 142, 145–46 (Pa. 1997) (establishing this tort and deciding 
a trust fund is the suitable equitable remedy). Some courts not recognizing 
this cause of action have construed it as a request for equitable relief. Mehl v. 
Canadian Pac. Ry. Ltd., 227 F.R.D. 505, 516 (D.N.D. 2005) (collecting cases). 
 79. See, e.g., Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co. of Kan., Inc., 510 P.2d 198, 200, 
204–05 (Kan. 1973) (declaring liability for a seller who makes a fraudulent 
misrepresentation or concealment material to the transaction when the buyer 
relies upon the fraud, and determining that a prospective purchaser of a resi-
dential building site would consider the soil’s saline condition a material fac-
tor); Kaddo v. King Serv. Inc., 673 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
(affirming a seller’s liability for fraud for not reporting extensive gasoline 
leakage to the property buyer). 
 80. See, e.g., Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1702–
1703 (2006) (requiring developers of subdivisions of 100 or more non-exempt 
lots to provide each purchaser with a disclosure document called a “property 
report”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 2007) (requiring sellers of residential 
realty to disclose the presence of “[s]ubstances, materials, or products which 
may be an environmental hazard such as . . . contaminated soil”); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. 12, ch. 248.30 (2006) (requir-
ing sellers to disclose any government-directed environmental testing, remov-
al, or remediation). However, unless the applicable disclosure law provides a 
private cause of action, it is outside the scope of this Note. 
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previous owner failed to disclose soil contamination on the pur-
chased property. Concealment, as contrasted with fraud, re-
quires only an act of omission instead of an affirmative act.81
Class actions have been appropriate devices in large-scale 
contamination cases, but they provide no real aid to the more 
common, small-scale incidents of soil contamination. Groups of 
prospective gardeners generally must satisfy four prerequisites 
for class certification: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation.
 
82 A class action seeking money to 
remediate garden soil must be superior to other adjudicative 
methods, and common questions of law and fact must predomi-
nate.83 Specific causation and damages require individual con-
sideration, but class treatment can be workable for mass toxic 
torts.84
Very few reported cases involve claims of damages for con-
taminating an urban garden specifically. One such case, 
Quarterman v. Kefauver from a California state appellate 
court,
 
85 illustrates how gardeners confronting soil contamina-
tion can use litigation to fund remediation. The plaintiffs were 
a married couple that had just bought their first house.86 The 
wife, an avid gardener, said she was drawn to the property by 
the gardening potential of its large backyard.87 The couple tilled 
their backyard and began growing tomatoes, cucumbers, apri-
cots, chard, raspberries, and many other herbs and flowers.88
 
 81. See, e.g., Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884, 894 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding liability for concealment where the defective soil 
conditions consisted of soil seepage and slides). 
 
Shortly thereafter, their next-door neighbor began sanding and 
repainting her old house, which released lead-bearing paint 
 82. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 23(a); GUAM R. CIV. P. 
23(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-23(a) (2005). 
 83. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.220(b)(3); TENN. 
R. CIV. P. 23.02(3); Puerto Rico v. M/V Emily S, 158 F.R.D. 9, 15 (D.P.R. 1994). 
 84. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 783, 787–
88 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (certifying a class in Agent Orange defoliant litigation, 
though recognizing that “there is a major dispute over whether Agent Orange 
can cause the injuries in question, and there are separate disputes over 
whether the exposure claimed in each case did cause the injuries claimed”). 
 85. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 86. Respondents’ and Cross-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 4, Quarterman, 
64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (No. A073984), 1996 WL 33454437 at *4. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Reply Brief of Cross-Appellants John Quarterman and Fabienne 
Blanc, Quarterman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (No. A073984), 1997 WL 33562194 at 
*20 & n.5.  
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dust and paint chips into the couple’s topsoil.89 Fearing lead 
contamination, the plaintiffs mostly stopped gardening.90 When 
the couple tested their soil, they found it to be ninety-seven 
times the state threshold for hazardous waste.91 Unable to con-
vince their neighbor to stop sanding altogether or to adopt 
paint removal methods that would generate less dust, the cou-
ple sued.92 A jury awarded the plaintiffs $120,850 in economic 
damages and $25,000 in noneconomic damages on theories of 
nuisance, trespass, and negligence.93
2. Major Environmental Statutes Used in Larger-Scale 
Contamination Situations 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) creates a federal 
remedy for soil contamination.94 CERCLA imposes strict liabil-
ity95 on any party that causes the release of hazardous sub-
stances at a facility.96 Various environmental statutes define 
what constitutes a CERCLA “hazardous substance,”97 and the 
Administrator of the EPA has discretion to further designate 
compounds as such.98 Because the law specifically excludes “pe-
troleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof” from the 
EPA’s purview,99 CERCLA provides no aid to many victims of 
soil contamination.100
 
 89. Quarterman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742–43.  
 
 90. Id. at 743.  
 91. Respondents’ and Cross-Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 86, at 
6–7. 
 92. Id. at 6–8. 
 93. Id. at 9. 
 94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). For CERCLA’s origin story, see H.R. 
REP. NO. 96-1016, at 1016–21 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 
6119–23. 
 95. Although CERCLA does not use the words “strictly liable,” this stand-
ard has been read in judicially. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 556 U.S. 599, 608 (2009). 
 96. Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of 
CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 903, 921–22 (2004). The definition of a “potentially responsible 
party” is laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
 97. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 
 98. Id. § 9602(a). 
 99. Id. § 9601(14). 
 100. See James B. Brown & Glen C. Hansen, Nuisance Law and Petroleum 
Underground Storage Tank Contamination: Plugging the Hole in the Statutes, 
21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 643, 649 (1994) (noting that the exclusion “bars many plain-
tiff landowners from recovering”). 
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Under CERCLA, any party, public or private, may sue to 
recover costs associated with contamination,101 even for contam-
ination that occurred before Congress enacted the statute.102 
CERCLA supplies the EPA with three options for contamina-
tion response. First, the EPA can take immediate “removal” ac-
tion when there is either a release or a threat of a release of a 
hazardous substance into the environment that presents a 
threat to the public health and welfare.103 Second, the EPA may 
compel responsible parties to “remediate” the site, which is a 
more permanent treatment than less-demanding removal.104 If 
the responsible parties fail to remediate, the EPA can abate the 
contamination itself then sue for cost recovery, plus civil penal-
ties and damages.105 Third, when the EPA cannot find any re-
sponsible party, it is permitted to clean up sites itself using a 
special trust fund called the Superfund.106 Because remedial 
Superfund actions lack the urgency of removal actions, the EPA 
may undertake them only at sites it registers on a National 
Priorities List (NPL).107 Even then, the EPA does not actively 
regulate most of the contaminated sites registered on the 
NPL.108 That is in part because state and local government 
agencies dominate CERCLA enforcement.109
 
 101. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Car-
bon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Car-
bon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103, 128 (2008). 
 
 102. Kathleen Chandler Schmid, Student Article, The Depletion of the Su-
perfund and Natural Resource Damages, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 483, 500 
(2008). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23); 300 C.F.R. § 300.415(b) (2012). 
 104. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining “removal” in terms of mini-
mizing damage to the public health or welfare as a result of environmental 
threats), with id. § 9601(24) (defining “remedial action” as “those actions con-
sistent with permanent remedy”). 
 105. Klass, supra note 96, at 922 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3)). 
 106. Schmid, supra note 102, at 484. 
 107. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1). The full NPL is at id. pt. 300, app. B. This 
Note primarily concerns urban gardens that are only mildly contaminated, 
and would thus not meet the NPL’s high threshold. For further discussion of 
the NPL, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-656, SUPERFUND: 
LITIGATION HAS DECREASED AND EPA NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION ON SITE 
CLEANUP AND COST ISSUES TO ESTIMATE FUTURE PROGRAM FUNDING RE-
QUIREMENTS 12–15 (2009). 
 108. Ronald G. Aronovsky, A Preemption Paradox: Preserving the Role of 
State Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 233 
(2008). Commonly, federal agencies with jurisdiction will approve a state pro-
gram enforcing the federal agency’s mandate. Will Reisinger et al., Environ-
mental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Al-
low Citizen Suits to Pick up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 6–7 
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A private party, on the other hand, has only one CERCLA 
option if the EPA does not act: pay to clean up the site and sue 
the responsible parties directly for reimbursement.110 The cur-
rent owner of contaminated land often qualifies as a potentially 
responsible party (PRP),111 but one PRP may recover voluntary 
cleanup costs from other PRPs.112 This is significant in the con-
text of urban agriculture because gardeners can often be PRPs, 
yet will not be prohibited from suing other PRPs, including 
some former owners of the land.113
However, unlike a government entity, a private plaintiff 
cannot recover damages under CERCLA.
 
114 To recover damages 
for harms suffered like personal injury or diminution in proper-
ty value, a gardener will have to complement the strict liability 
CERCLA option with the common law.115
Many states have enacted their own environmental clean-
up statutes emulating CERCLA.
 
116 For example, the Minnesota 
Department of Agriculture and the Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency enforce the Minnesota Environmental Response 
and Liability Act (MERLA).117
 
(2010). 
 MERLA also imposes liability on 
past and present owners and operators of any facility where 
 109. Aronovsky, supra note 108, at 233; David L. Markell, The Role of De-
terrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The 
Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000) 
(“States conduct roughly ninety percent of the inspections in this country, and, 
according to leading state officials, they bring approximately eighty to ninety 
percent of all enforcement actions.”). 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
 111. Id. § 9607(a)(1). This is subject to an exception for bona fide prospec-
tive purchasers. Id. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r)(1). 
 112. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 141 (2007). 
 113. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(2) (identifying current and former owners 
and operators as PRPs). 
 114. See id. § 9607(a)(4) (allowing, among other things, the recovery of re-
sponse costs). 
 115. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing common law claims for redressing soil 
contamination). 
 116. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d 257, 263 
n.2 (Wis. 2003) (“Following the implementation of CERCLA, state legislatures 
enacted similar legislation that would apply to hazardous waste identified un-
der the federal program as well as other substances that other states saw the 
need to control.”); see Catherine J. LaCroix, Urban Agriculture and Other 
Green Uses: Remaking the Shrinking City, 42 URB. LAW. 225, 278–80 (2010) 
(explicating some differences between federal and state cleanup legislations). 
A complete listing of state hazardous substance cleanup laws is in 57 AM. JUR. 
Trials § 40 (2011). 
 117. MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01–.20 (2012). 
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hazardous substances were located, transporters of hazardous 
substances to a facility, and generators of hazardous waste.118 
Moreover, a responsible party is strictly liable for injury or loss 
of use to real or personal property, including past or future 
profits and all damages for death, personal injury, or disease,119 
which is not available to litigants availing themselves of 
CERCLA.120 Surprisingly, a few cities have even enacted Super-
fund laws of their own, as did Lodi, California,121 a city of only 
about 63,000.122
E. MANY STATES MAINTAIN HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE FUNDS TO 
REIMBURSE PRIVATE PARTIES FOR CERTAIN SPECIFIC TYPES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION 
 
Many states have created hazardous substance reim-
bursement funds to help private parties address certain well-
known contaminants or to help clean up sites for a specified 
use. Unlike the Superfund, which reimburses only the federal 
government for cleaning up contaminated sites, many state 
hazardous substance funds provide compensation to private 
parties. 
One such scheme is Minnesota’s Petrofund.123
 
 118. Id. § 115B.03, subdiv. 1. 
 The pro-
gram’s managing Petroleum Tank Release Compensation 
 119. Id. § 115B.05. 
 120. See Klass, supra note 96, at 923 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2006)) 
(“Private parties are limited to recovering ‘response’ costs or monies toward a 
cleanup.”). 
 121. LODI, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 8, ch. 8.20 (1995); see also Fire-
man’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding no preemption by duplication between CERCLA and Lodi’s ordi-
nance). 
 122. 2012 CITY POPULATION RANKINGS, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN. (May 2012), 
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e 
-1/documents/Rankcities_2012.xls. 
 123. The Petrofund is regulated by the Petroleum Tank Release Cleanup 
Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 115C.01–.13. Currently, thirty-six other states have funds 
to reimburse private parties for cleaning up contamination from petroleum 
storage tanks. E-mail from Joel Fischer, Dir., Petrofund, Minn. Dep’t of Com-
merce, to author (Mar. 22, 2012, 10:23 CST) (on file with author); see, e.g., Oil 
Contaminated Site Environmental Cleanup Fund, MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. 
§§ 4-701 to -708 (LexisNexis 2012); Cleanup of Discharged Petroleum, NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 590.700–.920 (LexisNexis 2012) (Nevada’s Petroleum Fund); Oil 
Discharge, Disposal and Cleanup Fund, Fuel Oil Discharge Cleanup Fund, 
Motor Oil Discharge Cleanup Fund, and Gasoline Remediation & Elimination 
of Ethers Fund, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 146-D to -G (LexisNexis 2012); Vir-
ginia Petroleum Storage Tank Fund, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:10 to :13 
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Board refunds up to ninety percent of the reasonable corrective 
costs that parties incur in remediating a petroleum spill from 
an underground storage tank, with a cap of $1 million for a sin-
gle release.124 Eligible applicants are diverse, encompassing 
owners of petroleum tanks, homeowners, school districts, gov-
ernment agencies, and others.125 Parties whose insurance co-
vers cleanup costs are ineligible for Petrofund reimburse-
ments.126 As of 2011, the Petrofund has reimbursed over $400 
million in petroleum cleanup costs.127
Minnesota also administers a program called the Agricul-
tural Chemical Response and Reimbursement Account 
(ACRRA).
 
128 ACRRA reimburses private parties who clean up 
agricultural chemical contamination, such as that from pesti-
cides or fertilizer.129 ACRRA covers eighty percent of cleanup 
costs greater than $1000, and up to $350,000.130 Registration 
and license surcharges levied directly on pesticide and fertilizer 
distributors and dealers provide ACRRA with funding.131 
ACRRA is unique because, according to one Minnesota De-
partment of Agriculture official, it is “the only state agriculture 
agency in the country that has [S]uperfund authority and one 
of a very few that has . . . funds that provide reimbursement for 
site remediation.”132 ACRRA only reimburses parties if the 
Minnesota Department of Agriculture requests and pre-
approves the work.133
 
(2012). Although other states have similar programs, this Note primarily cites 
Minnesota’s for the sake of a consistent example. 
 So, a gardener that remediated soil laden 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 115C.09, subdiv. 3(a); MINN. R. 2890.4500, subpt. 3 
(2012). 
 125. What We Do: Petrofund, MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://mn.gov/ 
commerce/topics/Petrofund/What-We-Do-Petrofund.jsp (last visited Mar. 11, 
2013); see MINN. STAT. § 115C.09, subdivs. 3a–3b (restricting program eligibil-
ity to applicants that were not a responsible party). 
 126. See In re Application of Crown CoCo, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1990). 
 127. Stephanie Dickrell, Sitting on a Spill, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Minn.), Dec. 
13, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 25666167. 
 128. MINN. STAT. § 18E.03 (2012). 
 129. Agricultural Chemical Response & Reimbursement Account, MINN. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.mda.state.mn.us/grants/disaster/acrra.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2013) [hereinafter About ACRRA]. 
 130. MINN. STAT. § 18E.04, subdiv. 4(a).  
 131. Id. § 18E.03, subdivs. 3(c), 4. 
 132. E-mail from Greg Buzicky, Dir., Pesticide & Fertilizer Mgmt. Div., 
Minn. Dep’t of Agric., to author (June 2, 2011, 14:49 CST) (on file with author). 
 133. MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, VOLUNTARY INVESTIGATION AND 
CLEANUP PROGRAM, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT #21, at 6 (Feb. 1998), available at 
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with toxic pesticides or fertilizers without the Department of 
Agriculture’s imprimatur ex ante is ineligible for reimburse-
ment.134 Other niche property uses, such as dry cleaning, also 
have their own hazardous substance reimbursement funds 
available for soil contamination.135
These reimbursement funds are often governed by a board 
with specialized expertise in the relevant subject matter. For 
instance, the ACRRA board comprises five members: a repre-
sentative of agricultural chemical registrants, a representative 
of manufacturers and dealers, a representative of farmers, the 
Department of Agriculture Commissioner, and the Department 
of Commerce Commissioner.
 
136 By contrast, Maryland’s Waste 
Management Administration runs the state Oil Contaminated 
Site Environmental Cleanup Fund without a special oversight 
board.137
Special assessments are a common vehicle for funding such 
trusts. Ohio’s Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release 
Compensation Board assesses owners and operators of under-
ground storage tanks, using that money solely for the correc-
tion of pollution problems from underground storage tanks.
 
138 
Because the Board covers response costs, Ohio’s fund, called 
the Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Financial 
Assurance Fund, has been analogized to an insurance policy.139 
Ohio’s fund is supplemented by the interest earned on it,140 and 
by appropriations from the general revenue fund.141
 
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=3344.  
 Others, like 
Minnesota’s Petrofund, also receive funding from wholesale 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Dry Cleaner Environmental Response and Reimbursement Law, 
MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.47–.51 (2012); Drycleaner’s Environmental Response Act, 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-217-101 to -113 (West 2012). 
 136. MINN. STAT. § 18E.05, subdiv. 1(a) (specifying the composition of the 
Petrofund Board); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 590.820 (LexisNexis 2012) (not-
ing that the “Board to Review Claims” consists of, among others, a “repre-
sentative” from both “refiners of petroleum” and “independent retailers of pe-
troleum”). 
 137. MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE OIL CONTAM-
INATED SITE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP FUND 1 (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www 
.mde.maryland.gov/assets/document/OilControl/15th_Annual_Cleanup_ 
Report_FY08.pdf; see MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 4-701 to -708 (LexisNexis 
2012). 
 138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3737.87–.98 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 139. Amoco Oil Co. v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release 
Comp. Bd., 733 N.E.2d 592, 594 (Ohio 2000). 
 140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3737.91(A)(2). 
 141. Id. § 3737.91(A)(3). 
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gasoline taxes, a cost often passed on to the consumer.142 The 
Petrofund tax is collected only when the fund balance drops to 
a certain amount.143
Some states maintain dual schemes for state response and 
for private recompense. California operates what are essential-
ly two separate cleanup funds: the Hazardous Substance Ac-
count
 
144 and a compensatory hazardous substance cleanup 
fund.145 The former provides for state response and remedial ac-
tions,146 while the latter directly reimburses private parties.147 
California reimburses private parties not just for the costs of 
out-of-pocket cleanup, but also for medical expenses and certain 
wage and income losses.148 Ohio, on the other hand, pays third 
parties out of its fund for bodily injury and property damage 
resulting from petroleum releases.149
II.  EXISTING LEGAL REMEDIES FOR SOIL 
CONTAMINATION IN URBAN AGRICULTURE ARE 
CUMBERSOME, EXPENSIVE, AND UNDULY TIME-
CONSUMING   
 
Because no comprehensive legal regime covers soil contam-
ination in urban agriculture, there are many ways in which the 
problem is wholly or partially unaddressed. This Part examines 
the imperfections of available options and how they can dis-
courage individuals from engaging in urban agriculture. The 
lack of funding solutions is a major problem in reducing soil 
contamination to a level where gardening becomes viable in 
terms of time and money. Litigation can be time-consuming, 
 
 142. Dean Rebuffoni, Petroleum Tank Cleanup Effort Faces Shortage of $34 
Million, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 28, 1993, at 1A, available at 
1993 WLNR 3954083. 
 143. THE MINNESOTA PETROLEUM TANK RELEASE CLEANUP FUND, MINN. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE 2 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.state.mn.us/mn/ 
externalDocs/Commerce/Publications_110402020002_PetroBrochure2.pdf; see 
Meeting Minutes 4, Petroleum Tank Release Comp. Bd. (May 12, 2010), avail-
able at http://mn.gov/commerce/images/PFMinutes05-12-10.pdf (noting that 
the two cent tax would be imposed for fiscal year 2011 because the Petrofund 
treasury had dropped below $4 million). 
 144. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300–25395.45 (West 2012). This is 
essentially the California state equivalent of CERCLA. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 145. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25370–25382. 
 146. Id. § 25363. 
 147. Id. § 25375. 
 148. Id. 
 149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3737.92(A)(3) (LexisNexis 2012). 
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expensive, and ill-fitted for the particulars of urban agriculture, 
and thus untenable for the average urban gardener. The EPA’s 
enforcement discretion creates uncertainty as to whether the 
government will act, and the Agency will almost certainly ig-
nore properties that are only mildly contaminated.  
A. DIFFICULTIES IN SELF-REMEDIATION PREVENT MANY 
PRIVATE PARTIES FROM BEING FULLY COMPENSATED FOR THEIR 
INJURIES 
When gardeners want to grow produce in their own back-
yards, they might address potential contamination themselves. 
However, roadblocks await these enterprising locavores. Alt-
hough soil analysis testing is available, it can be expensive and 
generally will not test for all possible harmful compounds.150 
The challenges of detecting and assessing contamination are 
succeeded by the problems of fixing it. For example, raised 
beds, a cheaper remediation option, prevent contaminants from 
entering produce through the roots151 but do nothing to prevent 
inhalation of soil dust.152 Phytoremediation removes soil con-
tamination,153 but gardeners must properly dispose of the 
plants used during this process, as the plants themselves will 
become contaminated.154
Effectiveness aside, all of these remediation methods cost 
money. Combined with the other, non-remediative costs of set-
ting up a garden,
 Of course, no remediation method will 
completely rid urban environments of all pollution. Soil reme-
diation endeavors to mitigate unhealthy contamination, and 
viewed from that perspective it often succeeds. 
155
 
 150. See Turner, supra note 
 the expense of proper remediation may 
completely foreclose the garden’s establishment. 
38, at 5–6 (discussing testing programs in the 
four to twenty dollar range). 
 151. See Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1536–37. 
 152. Josh Beniston & Rattan Lal, Improving Soil Quality for Urban Agri-
culture in the North Central U.S., in CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN URBAN ECO-
SYSTEMS 302 (Rattan Lal & Bruce Augustin eds., 2012). 
 153. See National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency 
Plan; National Priorities List Update, 64 Fed. Reg. 51496-02, 51498 (Sept. 23, 
1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
 154. See SUTHAN S. SUTHERSAN, REMEDIATION ENGINEERING: DESIGN 
CONCEPTS 263 (Suthan S. Suthersan ed., 1999) (acknowledging the limitations 
of phytoremediation and listing the “[e]valuation and development of proper 
handling and disposal methods for the harvested . . . plants” as a “knowledge 
gap”). 
 155. See Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1552 (noting the use of tax incentives 
and abatements in Buffalo, New York to defray “the burden of high start-up 
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The major shortcoming of government grants is that they 
are not universally available, and they are often available only 
for properties more severely contaminated than the average 
residential property.156 Governments usually issue grants only 
in specific situations, and usually only to nonprofits and gov-
ernments.157 Even with the right people or organizations apply-
ing, a proposed urban garden site and use are unlikely to quali-
fy in this competitive process.158 The EPA, for one, maintains 
strict conditions for eligibility that are focused on redevelop-
ment.159 As there are not enough funds for the EPA to respond 
to all eligible properties, only the most severely contaminated 
sites received funding based on a competitive ranking sys-
tem.160 Grants can be unreliable because there is no guarantee 
the funding will continue. Unlike an established, statutory pro-
gram, grant funding distributed by administrative agencies or 
private organizations can run out more easily and on shorter 
notice, especially with more parties competing for the money.161
Without grants, the individual will frequently be ultimate-
ly responsible for remediation costs. Placing the remediation 
onus on individual gardeners or organizations makes gardening 
less accessible to the low-income communities which are most 
likely to have soil contamination.
 
162 These low-income commu-
nities are in the greatest need of healthy, low-cost foods.163
 
costs” of urban agriculture). 
 
 156. See, e.g., Minnesota Targeted Brownfield Assessment Program, supra 
note 68. 
 157. See, e.g., FY13 Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment Grants, supra 
note 65; FY13 Guidelines for Brownfields Cleanup Grants, supra note 63. 
 158. See 45 TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 13.2(b)(1) (2d 
ed. 2012) (stating that “grants are competitive” and listing the factors the EPA 
considers during its comprehensive review of proposals). 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k)(3)(C) (2006). 
 160. See id. § 9604(k)(5)(C); cf. infra note 208 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing EPA’s enforcement discretion). 
 161. See Vinnie Bevivino, How Grant-Funded Urban Farming Can Teach 
Us, but Not Feed Us, SEED & CYCLE, http://www.seedandcycle.com/articles/ 
grant-funded-food-security (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (“[T]he pool for funding 
is only getting smaller. We can fight for additional funding for urban farms, 
but a grant-funded food system can expand only as fast as the funders.”). 
 162. See Madeline Gallo, From Wood Treatment to Unequal Treatment: The 
Story of the St. Regis Superfund Site, 29 LAW & INEQ. 175, 197 (2011) (“Envi-
ronmental justice communities are not likely to have the funds necessary to 
complete a remediation of a Superfund site.”). 
 163. See REBECCA FLOURNOY, POLICYLINK, HEALTHY FOOD, HEALTHY 
COMMUNITIES 6 (2011), available at http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/% 
7B97c6d565-bb43-406d-a6d5-eca3bbf35af0%7D/HFHC_FINAL.PDF (“For dec-
ades, low-income urban . . . communities have faced limited opportunities to 
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B. LITIGATION IS FAR TOO DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE FOR 
MOST URBAN GARDENERS TO REALISTICALLY CONSIDER 
Private parties may also consider suing the prior owners or 
the parties responsible for the contamination in order to facili-
tate soil remediation. However, this solution is ineffective be-
cause common law tort and contract theories fail to respond ad-
equately to the issue of soil contamination. There are problems 
with both the causes of action themselves, such as the difficulty 
in proving causation, and the high costs inherent in litigation. 
1. Many Particular Causes of Action Do Not Lend Themselves 
Well to an Urban Gardening Context 
No judicially cognizable cause of action specifically ad-
dresses soil contamination in the context of urban agriculture. 
Still, urban gardeners may sue on theories of nuisance, tres-
pass, negligence, strict liability, or contract, just like any non-
gardening party harmed by environmental contamination.164
But there are flaws with the application of these causes of 
action to urban agriculture in particular. For instance, some of 
these causes of action, like fraudulent concealment, require sci-
enter.
  
165 A buyer may laudably wish to use the land to cultivate 
a small garden but will still need to show that that the seller 
concealed or misrepresented that land’s contaminated state in 
the transaction. Given the standard polluted urban environ-
ment in which contamination is more or less uniformly distrib-
uted between properties, it is unlikely that a court will find a 
seller liable for not telling the buyer that the property is slight-
ly contaminated—most urban sellers probably do not realize 
that their soil is unsuitable for agriculture. To be liable, a seller 
would probably have to have specifically known of the soil con-
tamination after conducting a soil assessment.166
The much larger problem with the environmental torts is 
proving causation. Normally, a trier of fact can infer causation 
when the plaintiff was uninjured before an accident, but suf-
 
 
purchase . . . fresh, healthy, affordable foods.”). 
 164. See Quarterman v. Kefauver, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997); supra Part I.D. 
 165. See, e.g., Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 1987); RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 550 (1938). 
 166. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Baum, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 904, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (stating that a fraudulent concealment claim requires a seller’s 
knowledge of a material fact that is unknown to the buyer or not within the 
buyer’s “reach of diligent attention and observation”). 
  
1530 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1507 
 
fered from an injury afterward.167 In toxic injury cases, courts 
generally prohibit these types of inferences because toxic expo-
sure is invisible, its effects are delayed, and alternative causes 
are always possibilities.168 After all, different people exposed to 
the same toxin will react differently over time.169 Specifically, 
different people may experience different latency periods, 
which wreaks statutes of limitations problems.170
In many states, plaintiffs have no viable cause of action 
when they buy property years after the contamination oc-
curred. Jurisdictions diverge on whether the statute of limita-
tions begins running when the conduct ceases
 
171 or when the in-
jury ceases.172 Even under the latter, more lenient standard, the 
limitations period may cease tolling once a property owner ac-
quires actual or constructive knowledge that there is soil con-
tamination, even though the damage persists.173





 167. Gold, supra note 
 Even after the advent of statutory envi-
46, at 1511. 
 168. Id. at 1511–12. These plaintiffs usually must prove both general and 
specific causation. Id. at 1512. 
 169. Sexton et al., supra note 46, at 13. 
 170. Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 n.11 
(1993) (“In combination, issues of exposure, causation, and latency periods 
make environmental torts extraordinarily burdensome.”). 
 171. See, e.g., FDIC v. Laidlaw Transit, 21 P.3d 344, 356 (Alaska 2001) 
(“[S]ince [the defendants-contaminators] have lost their connection to the land, 
they cannot be characterized as maintaining an ongoing nuisance.”); Alston v. 
Hormel Foods Corp., 730 N.W.2d 376 (Neb. 2007) (holding that continuing ill 
effects of prior tortious acts and the failure to right a wrong committed outside 
the statute of limitations are insufficient to establish a continuing tort). 
 172. See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating 
Co., 488 S.E.2d 901, 925 (W. Va. 1997) (“As long as the arsenic remains on the 
Kermit Lumber business site in amounts above the regulatory limits and as 
long as the arsenic is flowing into the Tug Fork River, the harm or nuisance 
continues and thus, is a continuing (or temporary) nuisance.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 cmt. b (1965) (“The actor’s failure to remove from 
land in the possession of another a . . . thing which he has tortiously erected or 
placed on the land constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time during 
which the thing is wrongfully on the land . . . .”). 
 173. See, e.g., Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 45 So. 3d 991, 994–95, 1001, 
1007 (La. 2010) (dismissing a continuing tort suit because the Louisiana De-
partment of Environmental Quality had informed plaintiffs of environmental 
contamination more than one year before the suit commenced). 
 174. The common law is flexible; harms unimaginable 400 years ago may 
still be remedied today with the tools fashioned at that time. Compare, e.g., 
Aldred’s Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.), 9 Co. Rep. 57 b (successful nui-
sance action where pig sty emitted noxious fumes), with Lesh v. Chandler, 944 
N.E.2d 942, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (successful nuisance action where neigh-
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ronmental causes of action, courts have seen more common law 
strict liability cases.175
2. Few Urban Gardeners Will Want to Experience the Hassle 
and Cost of Litigation 
 
The claims underlying litigation may be less an issue than 
the pursuit of litigation itself. Litigation has many significant 
and well-documented disadvantages.176 First, suing a prior 
owner or landlord for knowingly possessing contaminated land 
compromises a plaintiff’s privacy in a way that self-remediation 
does not. A gardener may lose and have to pay the winning op-
ponent’s expenses and costs. Even if the plaintiff “wins,” the 
damages awarded may be much less than hoped for, and insuf-
ficient to cover the cost of remediating the soil. The entire pro-
cess may take years, which can frustrate a community garden-
er who wants to simply,177 quickly,178 and cheaply179
 
bors blasted music and shined spotlights on plaintiffs’ home). 
 begin 
growing and consuming homegrown food. Litigation is often 
more expensive than testing and remediating the soil for one’s 
self, especially when dealing with small urban residential plots. 
For instance, in the California case discussed earlier where the 
court awarded damages against a defendant for contaminating 
 175. Klass, supra note 96, at 935. Professor Klass also identifies the plain-
tiff’s burden in demonstrating that the risks of the polluting activity cannot 
reasonably be diminished as an impediment to strict liability in environmental 
tort actions. Id. (citing GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 122 (2d ed. 2001)). 
 176. While many of the disadvantages of litigation are rather obvious, the 
subject is meticulously treated in ROBERT C. PRATHER, SR. & JOE L. COPE, 
TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 5:22–5:29 
(2012). 
 177. See Kristen Choo, Plowing Over: Can Urban Farming Save Detroit 
and Other Declining Cities? Will the Law Allow It?, 97 A.B.A. J. 42, 70 (2011) 
(imagining that a prospective gardener might look at the complicated urban 
agriculture ordinance in Kansas City, Missouri and say, “This is so complicat-
ed you need a lawyer to figure it out. And I just want to have a garden.”). 
 178. See Quarterman v. Kefauver, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 741–43 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997) (adjudicating a case that spanned five years from when the disa-
greement first arose until the issuance of an appellate opinion); JIM NOLLMAN, 
WHY WE GARDEN: CULTIVATING A SENSE OF PLACE 39 (2005) (“Twenty-five 
years is an incredible commitment to a [tree] garden. Most people are too busy 
to care. They may not own their own house, and a twenty-five-year allegiance 
to a stranger’s property seems unrealistic.”). 
 179. Since one reason that people grow their own gardens is to save money, 
“savings on vegetables are a relevant factor in making the decision to garden 
and should be included in any decision model.” James R. Blaylock & Anthony 
E. Gallo, Modeling the Decision to Produce Vegetables at Home, 65 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 722, 722 (1983). 
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an urban garden, the plaintiffs claimed over $420,000 in attor-
ney fees.180
Resort to the judicial system is also problematic for the 
community at large.
 
181 A sizeable percentage of litigation costs, 
especially with CERCLA, go to inefficient transaction costs—
money that is not going toward establishing or maintaining 
community gardens.182 If owners of small, mildly contaminated 
plots are deterred from farming, they and their community are 
deprived of many of the practice’s benefits, including creating 
jobs and improving the health of local residents.183
Concrete numbers illustrate the absurdity that a gardener 
facing mild contamination might sue to set up an urban garden 
or be compensated for personal injuries. Take a gardener that 
wants to sue in, for example, San Francisco Superior Court. He 
must pay for filing fees ($355),
 These obser-
vations, of course, are completely independent of any assess-
ment of the gardener’s claim. Rather, these problems are in-
trinsic in litigation and are the necessary cost of entering the 
courthouse door. 
184 motion filing fees ($60 each),185 
depositions (a full day can cost over $1000 in reporter’s fees),186 
experts (which can cost around $1000 per day of testimony),187
 
 180. Quarterman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743. 
 
 181. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has written in ap-
proving a CERCLA consent decree, “[t]he reality is that, all too often, litiga-
tion is a cost-ineffective alternative which can squander valuable resources, 
public as well as private.” United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 
90 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 182. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFEC-
TIVE RISK REGULATION 18 (1993) (citing a report that in Superfund responses, 
ninety percent of insurance expenditures and twenty percent of firm expendi-
tures went to legal fees and other transaction costs). One U.S. Representative 
derisively described CERCLA as a “welfare and relief act for lawyers.” 126 
CONG. REC. H31,970 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Harsha). 
 183. See Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1523 (“Urban agriculture . . . serves a 
local demand for wholesome, inexpensive food, while providing residents with 
jobs, a method for eliminating neighborhood blight and a greater feeling of 
self-worth.”). 
 184. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 70611 (West Supp. 2013). 
 185. Id. § 70617(a). 
 186. WILLIAM F. RYLAARSDAM ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE, FED-
ERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ch. 8E-1, § 8:418; see, e.g., Lira v. Gar-
ner-Easter, No. CIV S-05-2512GEBKJMP, 2008 WL 3974731, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 22, 2008) ($1036.25 in deposition costs from court reporters and attor-
neys’ fees); accord, e.g., Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 52 F.R.D. 518, 520 
(W.D. Okla. 1971) ($1795.20 in deposition costs). 
 187. See, e.g., Bart Baggett, Forensic Documentation Fee Schedule, HAND-
WRITING SERVICES INT’L (May 23, 2012), http://handwritingexpertusa.com/cv/ 
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appeal filing fees (ranging from $330 to $655),188 and any other 
miscellaneous costs like postage and travel. Federal court is no 
cheaper; it costs around $15,000 to litigate a federal civil suit, 
exclusive of damages won.189 Using the rough formula of one 
dollar of investment yielding six dollars of benefits,190 a garden-
er must invest at least $3000 in his garden to recoup the costs 
of the average federal civil lawsuit.191
Class actions would seem to circumvent many of these 
problems with economies of scale.
 
192 However, the highly varia-
ble nature of soil contaminants can make establishing com-
monality difficult.193 But even where courts certify these clas-
ses, the cases are incredibly complex, and require proof of 
individual causation.194 Prospective class members often have 
difficulty retaining counsel195 because class action lawyers fre-
quently require contingency fees and may be very reluctant to 
take the case if the total claims for mildly contaminated gar-
dens are not large enough.196 Large monetary settlements may 
not net each individual class member enough money to estab-
lish a clean garden or make it seem worth their while.197
 
BartBaggett_Fee%20Schedule.pdf (charging $1200 per day this expert testi-
fies in court, exclusive of travel and meal costs). 
 Final-
ly, class actions require a lead plaintiff to spearhead litigation 
 188. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 70621; id. §§ 68926, 68926.1(b). 
 189. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES 35 tbl.4 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ 
lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf. 
 190. Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1531. 
 191. See LEE III & WILLGING, supra note 189, at 35 tbl.4. 
 192. Class actions can be used in environmental tort cases. See 19 
A.L.R. FED. 2d 303 (2007). 
 193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3). 
 194. See Martin v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.R.D. 580, 592 (D. Conn. 2000) (deny-
ing class certification where the court was not satisfied that the “common is-
sues of law and fact [we]re sufficient to overcome the extensive individualized 
proof of, inter alia, breach, causation and trespass that is likely to be re-
quired”). 
 195. See Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, Approaches to Environmental Jus-
tice: A Case Study of One Community’s Victory, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 
235, 250 (2011) (explaining the difficulties of obtaining counsel for environ-
mental injustice clients in general). 
 196. Id. at 251; Brennan, supra note 170, at 4 (“If the compensation availa-
ble through contingency fees from personal injury suits is insufficient, attor-
neys will pursue other kinds of cases.”). 
 197. Paben, supra note 195, at 251. 
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efforts;198 the motivation problem of pursuing claims for small 
urban gardens means plaintiffs will be hard to find.199
3. Federal and State Hazardous Substance Remediation 
Statutes Are Often No Better 
  
Community gardeners that do not wish to sue responsible 
parties for damages under the common law can resort to envi-
ronmental cleanup statutes that allow for recovery of response 
costs. An advantage of CERCLA is that a plaintiff does not 
need to show actual physical injury. Rather, an aggrieved party 
needs to demonstrate only that a hazardous substance was “re-
leased,” within the statutory definition,200 and that the threat of 
release necessitated the incurrence of response costs.201 In con-
trast, many torts require an actual injury to person or proper-
ty.202 The forms of relief offered by torts and environmental 
statutes also differ.203 Whereas a court may issue an injunction 
in a nuisance action, CERCLA does not allow private parties to 
seek an affirmative injunction to force remediation.204
But CERCLA has significant shortcomings for mildly con-
taminated urban gardens. CERCLA cleanups involve extensive 
contamination and are expensive, averaging around $30 mil-
 
 
 198. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 1109, 1177 (2011) (noting lead plaintiffs’ “private obligations and public 
aspirations”). 
 199. See id. at 1110; cf. NOLLMAN, supra note 178, at 39. 
 200. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(22), 9607(a) (2006). 
 201. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The plaintiff must also prove two other elements to 
establish a prima facie case: the site is a facility, and the defendant is a PRP. 
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. et al., Cost Recovery by Private Parties Under CERCLA: 
Planning a Response Action for Maximum Recovery, 27 TULSA L.J. 365, 382–
83 (1992). 
 202. See, e.g., Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 5 
(Miss. 2007) (“Exposure to a potentially harmful substance does not in itself 
constitute a personal injury. Persons who allege only exposure are asking for a 
remedy without a wrong.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Mark Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and Environmental Law: 
Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 764–65 
(2011) (“A fundamental principle of tort law is that there must be an actual 
physical injury to person or property, or at least actual serious emotional 
harm, for a cause of action to exist at common law.” (footnote omitted)). But see 
Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) 
(allowing recovery for medical monitoring even where no physical injury was 
present). 
 203. Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the 
Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 583 (2007). 
 204. Id. at 583 n.214. 
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lion.205 The cleanups are cumbersome206 and time-intensive, en-
tailing lengthy procedures that drag the entire process out an 
average of twelve years.207 Because the EPA has enforcement 
discretion, it typically deals with only the most severely im-
pacted sites,208 even though it theoretically could reach any con-
taminated site under CERCLA.209 This EPA policy effectively 
forecloses the possibility of pursuing cost recovery actions 
against several categories of parties.210 Many state environmen-
tal agencies exercise similar discretion, including the Minneso-
ta Pollution Control Agency under MERLA,211 although not all 
states all the time.212 Besides effectively ignoring mildly con-
taminated properties, enforcement discretion is troublesome 
because of its susceptibility to untoward political influence.213
 
 205. Scott E. Blair, Toxic Assets: The EPA’s Settlement of CERCLA Claims 
in Bankruptcy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1941, 1946 (2011) (citing RICHARD C. POR-
TER, THE ECONOMICS OF WASTE 219 (2002)). 
 
 206. Stefanie Gitler, Settling the Tradeoffs Between Voluntary Cleanup of 
Contaminated Sites and Cooperation with the Government Under CERCLA, 35 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 337, 357 (2008) (describing the EPA’s internal processes for 
identifying sites impacted enough to warrant remediation). 
 207. Blair, supra note 205, at 1946; see also David Rosenblatt, When Does a 
Superfund Cleanup “End”?, AM. COLL. OF ENVTL. LAWYERS (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.acoel.org/post/2011/04/04/When-Does-a-Superfund-Cleanup-End 
-.aspx (noting that EPA Guidance documents usually do not specify when long-
term operation and maintenance may cease, and enumerating the risks and 
costs associated with such uncertainty). 
 208. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: Is En-
forcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1342 (2004); see 
also Fortney, supra note 7, at 1877 n.119 (reviewing EPA data to compare the 
number of sites subject to CERCLA application with the number of sites on 
the National Priorities List that qualifies sites for Superfund money). 
 209. Fortney, supra note 7, at 1865. 
 210. Rechtschaffen, supra note 208, at 1342; see Brownfields: Lessons from 
the Field: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env’t of the H. 
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 54 (2001) (“Using Super-
fund to clean up these sites is like using a bulldozer to build a sandcastle.” 
(statement of R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Gov’t Affairs, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce)). 
 211. MINN. STAT. § 115B.17 passim (2000) (stating that the agency “may” 
take some action); ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDER-
STANDING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 222 n.170 
(2000). 
 212. For instance, the relevant Colorado statute requires state authorities 
to respond to emergency spills. James P. Young, Expanding State Initiation 
and Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 994 (1990). 
 213. Blair, supra note 205, at 1949 & n.41 (citing Dorothy M. Daley & Da-
vid F. Layton, Policy Implementation and the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy: What Factors Influence Remediation at Superfund Sites?, 32 POL’Y STUD. J. 
375, 387 (2004) (“Sites are systematically more likely to reach construction 
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Furthermore, parties can recover only the costs of cleanup 
under CERCLA.214 Urban gardeners will need to supplement 
CERCLA actions with state law tort claims in order to recover 
damages associated with diminution in property value, lost 
profits, lost rents, personal injury, or punitive damages.215 Some 
state CERCLA analogues allow plaintiffs to recover attorney’s 
fees in a successful action.216 However, a plaintiff must front the 
money to pursue a lawsuit that might not even succeed. Fur-
ther, Washington advises its courts to employ “equitable factors 
as the court determines are appropriate” to dictate recovery, 
which the statute helpfully suggests could include attorney’s 
fees.217 Some statutes address only specific kinds of contami-
nants.218
Like with torts, CERCLA hinders gardeners by requiring a 
PRP.
 
219 Many of the individuals or corporations who would oth-
erwise be liable might now be gone, especially in urban envi-
ronments where the land was collectively polluted over several 
decades by innumerable sources. This is not a problem when 
the government wants to remediate land; the Superfund was 
created for this very situation.220
C. PRIVATE PARTY-ACCESSIBLE FUNDS HAVE BEEN 
SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR RESPECTIVE FIELDS 
 But private parties do not 
have access to the Superfund, so the only way to recoup clean-
up expenditures is through lawsuits against PRPs. Absent a 
PRP, prospective plaintiffs are out of luck. 
Soil contamination reimbursement reserves have numer-
ous advantages. For one, any eligible private party may recover 
under the Petrofund221 or ACRRA,222
 
completion when an elected official from the site’s congressional district sits on 
a Superfund oversight committee.”)). 
 so long as the contamina-
 214. Klass, supra note 96, at 905. 
 215. Id. 
 216. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.080 (2012); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 115B.14 (2005); see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 
(1994) (disallowing prevailing CERCLA litigants to recoup attorney’s fees). 
 217. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.080. 
 218. Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) (federal Superfund law ex-
pressly excluding petroleum), with MINN. STAT. §§ 115C.01–.13 (2010) (Min-
nesota’s Petrofund program dealing only with petroleum). 
 219. Reitze, Jr. et al., supra note 201, at 383. 
 220. See Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, 
in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 8 (Richard L. 
Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). 
 221. See MINN. STAT. § 18E.05, subdiv. 2–3 (2005). 
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tion at issue is petroleum or fertilizers. This takes the burden 
of initiating actions under CERCLA or MERLA off the govern-
ment. Many of these programs have been very successful. The 
Petrofund has enabled the investigation and cleanup of over 
13,000 petroleum-contaminated sites in Minnesota over the 
program’s twenty-five-year existence.223 This is an impressive 
statistic, considering that in 1991, the entire state of Minnesota 
had 36,000 tanks at 13,000 sites.224 Without the Petrofund, its 
director predicts that most of these sites would never have been 
remediated, and many tank and property owners would have 
gone insolvent trying to pay for the work themselves.225
Nevertheless, the use of existing funds is often limited in 
scope. For example, the Petrofund covers only the remediation 
of petroleum spills and the removal of underground storage 
tanks.
 
226 The Petrofund sunsets every few years, necessitating a 
perennial legislative debate on renewing the program.227 Fur-
thermore, the Petrofund continuously faces funding issues.228 
The popularity of the program has previously overwhelmed the 
board, limiting its ability to control costs229 and increasing wait 
times for applicants to have their claims reviewed.230 Minneso-
ta, like many states, has struggled financially in the recent re-
cession.231
 
 222. See About ACRRA, supra note 
 Still, these programs can be affordable for state legis-
latures if they are kept small in scale. Programs such as 
ACRRA offer legislatures flexibility because the amount in the 
129. 
 223. E-mail from Fischer, supra note 123. 
 224. Jeanette H. Leete, Ground Water Quality and Management in Minne-
sota, 56 J. MINN. ACAD. SCI. 34, 37 (1991). 
 225. E-mail from Fischer, supra note 123. 
 226. THE MINNESOTA PETROLEUM TANK RELEASE CLEANUP FUND, supra 
note 143, at 2. 
 227. For example, the Petrofund was amended in 2003 to expire on June 
30, 2007. S.F. 905, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003). 
 228. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, 
STATE OF MINN., PETROFUND REIMBURSEMENT FOR LEAKING STORAGE TANKS 
64–65 (1993) (offering the program’s popularity and generosity as reasons why 
it faces funding shortfalls); Meeting Minutes, Petroleum Tank Release Comp. 
Bd., supra note 143 (estimating that it could not hire a new Petrofund analyst 
in fiscal year 2010 “due to statewide budget constraints”). 
 229. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., supra note 228, at 61. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., Martha Stoddard, Revenue Forecast Shrinks Shortfall, 
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 27, 2012, at 1B (predicting a $393 million budg-
et shortfall for the State of Nebraska in July 2013). 
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fund stays within fixed bounds defined by statute.232 As soon as 
the funds in the account reach the established upper limit, the 
fees charged are decreased to bring the fund back within the 
statutory bounds.233
III.  POLICYMAKERS SHOULD IMPLEMENT A FUND TO 
REIMBURSE PROSPECTIVE URBAN GARDENERS FOR 
SOIL REMEDIATION   
  
The central problem with soil contamination in urban agri-
culture is that it crops up on a small scale. Individually, mildly 
contaminated plots may not seem to present an issue worth leg-
islative attention. However, soil contamination imperils all of 
the direct and indirect benefits conferred by urban agriculture. 
Parallel law exists that could prove instructive in effective-
ly addressing this issue. Certain hazardous substance funds re-
imburse private parties for cleaning up specified contaminants 
like petroleum or pesticides, or for specified uses, like dry 
cleaning. This Part argues that states or municipalities should 
establish funds for private party remediators, limited not by 
the type of contaminant, but rather by subject matter: urban 
agriculture. Doing so will foster urban agriculture and let gov-
ernment and society reap the concomitant benefits.  
A. THE SOLUTION: A HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE REIMBURSEMENT 
FUND FOR URBAN AGRICULTURE 
States and cities should establish accounts to reimburse 
private parties for remediating contaminated property for use 
as an urban garden.234 A program would best succeed at the 
state or local level because those governments can adopt pro-
grams sensitive to their own unique geography and needs.235 
Urban gardens are often located on smaller pieces of property 
that the federal government is not willing to address.236
 
 232. See MINN. STAT. § 115C.09, subdivs. 3(a)–(b) (2005). 
 States 
have more motivation to help idle, impacted properties, because 
 233. See id. subdiv. 8. 
 234. Such accounts would be similar to Minnesota’s and Tennessee’s dry 
cleaner reimbursement funds. See supra note 135. 
 235. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brande-
is, J., dissenting) (encouraging “experimentation in the fields of social and 
economic science” by the states); Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmental Liability 
and the Brownfields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Federal Options for Redevel-
opment, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 106 (1996).  
 236. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 208, at 1342 (remarking upon federal 
EPA enforcement discretion). 
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that land is not contributing to the community tax base.237 An 
even more effective program could be run by local or metropoli-
tan governments, which are closer to the sites and thus better 
able to monitor the fund’s effectiveness.238 Local governments 
have already had several successes in the interstices of federal 
and state environmental regulation.239 Although states have ac-
cess to larger tax bases than do cities for underwriting this 
proposal, a program targeted at urban farming might gain 
more traction if implemented solely in urban areas.240
Although an urban agriculture program is best implement-
ed by states or municipalities, the EPA should continue to work 
concurrently with its state counterparts in developing a reim-
bursement account. Within the states, no single agency needs 
to administer the fund. For example, the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Revenue administers both Petrofund and ACRRA, in 
conjunction with the Department of Commerce and the De-
partment of Agriculture, respectively.
  
241 The state Department 
of Trade and Economic Development, meanwhile, administers 
grants to cover petroleum contamination situations explicitly 
circumscribed by the Petrofund.242
 
 237. Brian Thomas Lang, Note, Ohio’s Voluntary Action Program: Solving 
Ohio’s Toxic Waste Woes?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 285, 286 (1999). 
 To be clear, this fund would 
only be triggered by contaminated urban gardens or farms 
when the state decides not to exercise its enforcement discre-
tion and remediate the soil itself, with the expectation that it 
will later recover from a PRP or otherwise recoup costs from its 
own Superfund.  
 238. See Fortney, supra note 7, at 1892–95 (arguing for the creation of a 
local voluntary cleanup program for these reasons). 
 239. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collabora-
tion in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 973 n.47 (2007) (citing 
examples including local involvement in brownfield development and water-
shed management and arguing that “given the prevalence of nonpoint source 
pollution regulation in modern environmental protection, environmental pro-
tection is increasingly a local government issue”). 
 240. See Letter from John McCain, U.S. Senator, et al. to Tom Vilsack, 
Sec’y of Agric. (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.agri-pulse.com/ 
uploaded/knowyourfarmers.pdf (hinting at tension between larger-scale, rural, 
industrial agricultural operations and the smaller, newer urban gardens 
championed in this Note). 
 241. Jeff Zachman & Susan D. Steinwell, The Use of Tax Increment Financ-
ing in Redeveloping Brownfields in Minnesota, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACTS 254 (Craig 
L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2000). 
 242. Id. 
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With regard to a governing board, this proposal would be 
limited enough in scope that a small board of experts could re-
tain a firm grasp on the issue, including the reasonableness of 
proposed costs, and any other issues that may arise.243 Board 
representatives could include an environmental expert,244
The biggest obstacle to this fund is political inertia. There 
is no way around it: this proposal costs money. The current 
economic climate is not especially conducive to new, costly pro-
posals.
 as 
well as representatives from nonprofits, university extension 
services, and state agricultural or health departments. Chemi-
cal and toxin manufacturers could also be chosen at random for 
board service, perhaps from a large trade group composed of 
several different types of contaminant manufacturers, to en-
sure their industry has a voice. 
245 But programs like the Petrofund in Minnesota are 
successful models. The Minnesota legislature continues to fund 
the Petrofund because lawmakers realize that without the fi-
nancial impetus to undertake cleanups, far fewer parties, pub-
lic or private, would address spills.246 Legislators are arguably 
still behind the curve on urban agriculture.247 But, as the popu-
larity of urban gardening continues to swell and lawmakers 
take notice of the benefits and opportunities that have accrued 
over the past several decades,248 an urban agriculture contami-
nation fund may look much more palatable to legislators.249 The 
current lack of a clear and consistent legal regime for soil quali-
ty in community gardens is attributable in part to the newness 
of the urban agriculture movement. This might bode better for 
the fund proposal, as the lack of comprehensive legal treatment 
is not traceable to affirmative political resistance.250
 
 243. See supra notes 
 Legislative 
support for urban agriculture, in any form, also signals to the 
general public that urban agriculture is an important prac-
136–37 and accompanying text. 
 244. Experts are more well-versed in matters of risk regulation and can 
provide safety more inexpensively. BREYER, supra note 182, at 33–39. 
 245. See, e.g., Stoddard, supra note 231. 
 246. E-mail from Fischer, supra note 123. 
 247. See Morning Edition, supra note 19. 
 248. See Brown & Jameton, supra note 34, at 23 (mentioning previous con-
gressional subcommittee hearings on home gardens and Congress’s 1977 allo-
cation of $1.5 million to the Urban Gardening Program to promote urban 
farming). 
 249. E-mail from Fischer, supra note 123. 
 250. Where explicit biases do exist, “[b]road appreciation of the benefits of 
urban agriculture is needed to overcome both traditional and modern biases.” 
SMIT ET AL., supra note 22, at ch. 11, at 5. 
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tice.251 Before enacting CERCLA in 1980, Congress nearly in-
cluded an administrative compensation fund for direct private 
party payouts—the “Compensation” in the Act’s title.252 Con-
gress narrowly voted to eliminate this program, fearing it 
would be unworkable to determine who should be compensated 
for toxic injury253
Soil contamination in urban agriculture is easily ignored 
on an individual basis, but it is a huge problem in the aggre-
gate. The law does not pay the problem much remediative at-
tention, but that does not mean it is unimportant. A remedia-
tion fund is feasible because an increasing number of 
constituents want to form community gardens and grow low-
cost, healthy, and safe foods. There is a reasonable and achiev-
able funding arrangement that could work even in this econo-
my. 
—a concern more easily addressed in urban 
agriculture by having a board of experts govern disbursement 
from a niche fund. 
B. THE MECHANICS OF THE PROPOSED FUND 
The scale of the remediation program would be flexible. 
The statutory account minimums and maximums are complete-
ly up to the state or local government to set. A state can keep 
the scale of the program small in size and temporality, through 
sunset provisions long enough to test the concept’s effective-
ness. The enacting jurisdiction could also let the appropriate 
administrative agency or the fund’s board promulgate adminis-
trative rules setting the program’s size.254
The program’s voluntary nature is necessary because the 
wholesale remediation of all contaminated properties is not cost 
effective. Cost effectiveness is a recurring theme throughout 
CERCLA, which makes PRPs in remediation actions responsi-
ble for all costs incurred by the government not inconsistent 
 
 
 251. See 157 CONG. REC. E1712-03, E1713 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2011) 
(statement of Rep. Cleaver) (“We need to teach our young healthy eating hab-
its, promote physical activity, and increase access to fresh foods by . . . embrac-
ing farmers markets and urban farming.”). 
 252. Setting the Bar for “Injury” in Environmental Exposure Cases: How 
Low Can It Go?, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10785, 10787 (2012). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Cf. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Rule 
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 108 (D.D.C. 2011) (expressing deference to adminis-
trative agencies when “examining conclusions made at the frontiers of science” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983))). 
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with the National Contingency Plan.255 The National Contin-
gency Plan, in turn, must include “means of assuring that re-
medial action measures are cost-effective over the period of po-
tential exposure to the hazardous substances or contaminated 
materials.”256 The Code of Federal Regulations provides further 
criteria for determining cost effectiveness: long-term effective-
ness and permanence, reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume 
through treatment, and short-term effectiveness.257
This emphasizes that despite the very real danger posed by 
soil toxins, overkill is not necessary. Any gardener will need to 
thoroughly assess the contamination in situ and determine 
whether building a garden is feasible considering the level of 
unhealthy contaminants. The board of a hazardous urban agri-
cultural substance fund can use a “reasonable” standard to help 
determine whether or not to disburse funds, which is how the 
Petrofund operates.
  
258 The program might also apply only to 
sites that pose a health risk above a proscribed level.259 This is 
in part because additional regulations cost money that would 
otherwise be directed to health care expenditures.260
C. FUNDING SOURCES 
 Of course, 
technology is advancing so gardeners in more polluted envi-
ronments are increasingly able to remediate to the point where 
gardening is advisable. 
The appropriate state or municipality could levy taxes on 
both polluters and parties engaged in urban agriculture. Poll-
ing shows Americans are generally more receptive to programs 
that impose costs not on the public but on abstractions like 
“companies” or “power plants.”261
 
 255. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
 This has been done before. 
Federal Superfund financing comprised three separate taxes 
 256. Id. § 9605(a)(7). 
 257. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (2012). A more extensive cost-benefit analysis is 
outside the scope of this Note. 
 258. See MINN. STAT. § 115C.09, subdiv. 3(b) (2005) (“A reimbursement 
may not be made from the fund under this chapter until the board has deter-
mined that the costs for which reimbursement is requested were actually in-
curred and were reasonable.”). 
 259. Cf. Fortney, supra note 7, at 1885–86. 
 260. One estimate holds that a statistical life is lost for every $15 million 
expenditure. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 
2278 (2002). 
 261. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism 
and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 514 (2007). 
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levied on chemicals, petroleum products, and corporations’ al-
ternative minimum taxable income in excess of $2 million,262 or 
at least until 1995 when Congress allowed those taxes to ex-
pire.263 With a program such as ACRRA, it is easy to identify 
who to tax: manufacturers of pesticides and fertilizers.264 This 
makes sense because the parties who benefit from pesticide and 
fertilizer production should be the ones to pay for those prod-
ucts’ deleterious effects.265
But it is infeasible to cherry-pick a few manufacturers to 
tax when urban soil contamination results from so many 
sources. A better approach would identify who benefits from 
urban agriculture, especially when past polluters are insolvent, 
non-existent, or not readily identifiable (for example, the own-
ers of automobiles in past generations that spewed lead-laden 
gasoline exhaust which then settled into nearby soil).
 Because the issue of contamination 
is related to property, the fund should tap into industrial prop-
erty taxes. 
266
This tax may seem politically infeasible at the outset, but a 
few facts are comforting. First, states and local governments al-
ready pay for urban garden initiatives out of their general rev-
enue.
 Be-
cause a primary goal, and result, of urban agriculture is eco-
nomic development, the community at large should shoulder 
much of the taxation. The urban agricultural sector could sup-
plement this through, perhaps, fees on farmers market pur-
chases, garden supply stores, or university tuitions. These 
sources should be combined with taxes on consumers or indus-
trial properties. 
267 More generally, Congress heavily subsidizes large rural 
farms, dispersing $248.6 billion in its 2002 farm bill.268
 
 262. Katherine N. Probst, Evaluating the Impact of Alternative Superfund 
Financing Schemes, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND 
LAW, supra note 
 The is-
220, at 154. 
 263. Schmid, supra note 102, at 511–12. As a consequence, the Superfund 
was almost entirely depleted by 2002. Id. at 512. There have been attempts in 
Congress to reinstate the tax. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H2887-03 (Mar. 3, 
2009) (statement of Rep. Blumanauer) (calling for “the reinstatement of the 
‘polluter pays’ principle for the Superfund program”). 
 264. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 265. E-mail from Fischer, supra note 123. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Schukoske, supra note 72, at 367–68 (citing S. 2000, 208th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.J. 1998)). 
 268. Jodi Soyars Windham, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Per-
verse Food Subsidies, Social Responsibility & America’s 2007 Farm Bill, 31 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J., Fall 2007, at 4 (“U.S. agribusiness is arguably 
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sue here is one of degree, not of absolutes. Second, the model 
Petrofund collects a two-cent tax when its fund drops to a cer-
tain level.269 Although the tax is technically assessed on gaso-
line wholesalers, in reality it is passed on to the consumer.270
Third, the great economic benefits of urban agriculture
 
So, this model is already in operation; proof of concept has been 
established.  
271 
mitigate the short-term pains of tax assessment. Money spent 
on local, urban agriculture stays local; communities benefit 
from the economic activities of soil testing and purchases of 
gardening equipment and clean soil.272 Furthermore, individu-
als or collectives often buy property for the express purpose of 
establishing an urban garden, sometimes to sell produce for 
profit, which again makes its way back into the account via 
taxes.273 The remediation of mildly contaminated properties is 
in the best economic interests of cities, so their being put to 
productive use helps salve the wounds created by a de minimis 
tax.274 Special concerns may surround community gardens in 
particular. Some states and cities provide community gardens 
with seed money275 or grant them tax-exempt status,276 reduce 
their tax assessments,277 or allow tax deductions.278
 
America’s largest corporate welfare recipient.”). But see Letter from John 
McCain et al. to Tom Vilsack, supra note 
 But, a pri-
240 (criticizing a Department of Ag-
riculture initiative designed to increase interest in production agriculture as 
“completely detached from the realities of production agriculture” and “aimed 
at small, hobbyist and organic producers whose customers” are affluent urban 
locavores). 
 269. MINN. STAT. § 115C.08, subdiv. 3 (2005); see THE MINNESOTA PETRO-
LEUM TANK RELEASE CLEANUP FUND, supra note 143. 
 270. See THE MINNESOTA PETROLEUM TANK RELEASE CLEANUP FUND, su-
pra note 143. 
 271. Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1531–32 (providing statistical data). 
 272. Id. at 1531. 
 273. Laura Berman, Urban Farming Idea Slowly Sprouts, DETROIT NEWS, 
Mar. 20, 2012, at A3, available at 2012 WLNR 5989265. 
 274. For instance, “a significant percentage of the garden members live 
outside of the communities where the gardens are located.” Sheila R. Foster, 
The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 580 (2006). Commuting gardeners will likely bring 
tax dollars into the community. 
 275. See supra note 155. 
 276. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 47-1061 (2005) (transferring a parcel of realty to 
a community garden land trust and declaring such land to be exempt from 
taxation so long as it is available to public use). 
 277. See Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1553–54 (discussing reduced tax as-
sessments as a tool to promote urban agriculture). 
 278. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 198(a) (2006). 
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vate remediation fund furthers the goals of tax bonuses and 
startup capital. Its implementation increases the value com-
munities reap from those outlays of public money. Just like res-
idential, single-user gardens, community gardens must pur-
chase shovels, seeds, and clean soil from somewhere. 
Using real numbers would illustrate how taxation could 
raise adequate contamination remediation funds. The State of 
Michigan collected almost $5 billion in commercial, industrial, 
and utility property taxes in 2008.279 Adding an urban agricul-
ture fee to raise that levy by 0.000683% would pay for 300 
raised beds per year, assuming raised beds cost about $112.280 
The City of Boston’s total tax levy was $1.615 billion in 2010; a 
small percentage of that would also significantly benefit the 
urban gardening movement.281 In Minnesota, a one-cent in-
crease in the gas tax raises approximately $27 to $28 million.282 
A fraction of a cent could raise thousands of dollars.283 These 
taxes on polluters could also incentivize polluters to reduce 
their pollution, at least in theory.284 A tax on farmers markets 
could complement this tax base. The Williamsburg Farmers 
Market, with fifty-two producers, generated about $48,970 in 
Virginia state sales tax in 2011;285
 
 279. STATE OF MICH., COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL AND UTILITY PROPERTY 
TAX REPORT ii, 2 (2008), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
treasury/2825_2008_CIU_Tax_Levy_Report_279563_7.pdf. 
 a ten-cent sales tax on simi-
larly sized markets would greatly aid a fund. An aggregation of 
small amounts from several sources would build up a sizable 
and effective account. More money collected from this system of 
 280. Compare Enact the Bay Street Area Raised Garden Beds Project, 
BROWN UNIV., http://brown.edu/Research/SRP/RAISED%20GARDEN% 
20BEDS%20PAMPHLET.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (describing a raised 
bed that can be built for $112), with Analysis, MCGILL SCH. OF ENV’T, MCGILL 
UNIV., http://mse-research.mcgill.ca/envr401_2002/brownfields/analysis.html 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (describing a raised bed with clean soil that alto-
gether costs $500). 
 281. Amanda Cedrone, Homeowners in Boston Get Tax Rate Hike, BOS. 
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2011, at 2. 
 282. AMY VENNEWITZ, SENATE TRANSP. POLICY COMM., TRANSPORTATION 
FUNDING AND MINNESOTA’S VEHICLE REGISTRATION TAX (1998), available at 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/report/transfund.htm. 
 283. See id. 
 284. See Meghan E. O’Neill, Note, Corporate Welfare?: State Tax Incentives 
for Air Pollution Control, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1717, 1727 (2003). 
 285. Farmers Market Q & A, FARMERS MARKET COALITION, http:// 
farmersmarketcoalition.org/joinus/faq (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
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taxation will likely stay in the community than money collected 
on food purchased in supermarkets.286
D. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD SOLVE MANY OF THE PROBLEMS OF 
EXPENSE AND DELAY PRESENTED BY CURRENT LEGAL 
APPROACHES 
 
This scheme would solve the cost and motivation problems 
facing gardeners. If it is too expensive and inefficient to pursue 
soil remediation, either in terms of cost or in terms of effort, a 
gardener will likely buy his food at the store.287 Casual garden-
ers may be reluctant to overcome these hurdles, even when fac-
ing the myriad prospective benefits.288 Discouraged gardeners 
threaten the time and efforts of governments and community 
organizations that have trained the gardeners.289
Private parties would not have to clean their properties 
under this system. If landowners did not want to use their land 
for urban agricultural purposes, they would be under no obliga-
tion to do so. Gardeners and community garden collectives are 
always free to ignore a fund and address the problem through 
the more traditional “self-help” methods discussed earlier, such 




A gardening individual or organization would be required 
to take the initiative to prepare the site before they could apply 
for reimbursement. Although this might still deter urbanites 
from gardening, it would on the whole make it a lot easier to 
realize a garden. It would take much less time to self-remediate 
the property and file for reimbursement than it would be to 
lobby the EPA or a state department of environmental quality 
to clean the site (which would not likely be successful due to 
the relatively low level of contamination often found in many 
residential zones bearing gardens) or file suit against past 
PRPs. 
 Further, if a gardener has suffered personal 
injury on top of the property injury, litigation remains an addi-
tional or alternative option. 
 
 286. See INDIE IMPACT STUDY SERIES: A NATIONAL COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
WITH THE AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS ASSOCIATION 8 (2012), available at http:// 
www.localfirst.org/images/stories/SLC-Final-Impact-Study-Series.pdf. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See supra Part I.A.  
 289. Borrelli, supra note 23, at 279–80 (explaining how gardens need per-
manence to be effective). 
 290. See Mogk et al., supra note 6, at 1536–37. 
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The fund will need to address how long a reimbursement 
recipient must operate the property as an urban garden. If the 
owner of a garden abandons it two months after receiving re-
mediation funds, program opponents might advocate making 
the owner return the money. However, this fund cannot realis-
tically monitor every garden to which it gives money—at least 
not without dramatically ballooning the fund’s budget. A more 
practical solution would be to require a short written proposal 
detailing how the applicant plans on gardening, including what 
steps they have taken to make the garden permanent and what 
costs they have sunk. A written proposal would assure the 
fund’s governing body that long-term gardening will indeed oc-
cur on the site after the board disburses money. The program’s 
upshot for recipients is free soil remediation—really, a benefit 
only realized in a gardening context. Thus, it is unlikely that 
many people will go through the effort to clean their soil if they 
are uncommitted to urban agriculture. Finally, clean soil, even 
if not used perpetually for a garden, has collateral benefits, in-
cluding the decreased likelihood children will incidentally in-
gest or inhale lead in soil and fall ill.291
This fund proposal might not fully address the environ-
mental justice aspects of this problem. A hazardous substances 
remediation fund geared toward urban agriculture would still 
require an outlay of capital not readily available to lower-





 291. Policy Barriers and Incentives to Reusing Brownfields for Community 
Gardens and Urban Agriculture: Urban Agriculture Webinar #2, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, transcript available at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/ 
urbanag/webinar2_transcript.htm. Even if the money goes toward construct-
ing raised beds, which still allow the inhalation of contaminated soil that sur-
rounds the raised beds, a gardener necessarily brings at least some clean soil 
onto the property to put in those beds. See supra notes 
 Such grants, which provide money up front to prospec-
tive gardeners, would solve the problem if there are sufficient 
payouts and the barriers to applying are relatively low. Gar-
dens can become overly reliant on grants for continued busi-
ness operation. However, a fund to fix soil contamination is, by 
its nature, a kickstart measure that does not engender reliance 
on a monetary source that might someday shrink, existentially 
imperiling the garden. 
48, 152 and accompa-
nying text.  
 292. See supra Part II.A. 
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  CONCLUSION   
It is vital to address soil contamination in urban agricul-
ture. Harmful contaminants can lurk in the soil, and sicken 
people working in the soil and eating food grown there. As ur-
ban farming explodes in popularity, more and more people will 
encounter this problem. Current legal approaches, while useful, 
are too narrow to achieve the ultimate objective of incentivizing 
people to garden in dense urban environments and grow low-
cost, healthy, and safe foods. The primary shortcoming of these 
tools is that a gardener must first identify a party responsible 
for contaminating the property and then sue him. Even when a 
gardener is able to find a solvent responsible party, pursuing 
litigation is prohibitively costly and time-intensive for most. 
However, a successful remedial system operates outside of ur-
ban agriculture. Funds that reimburse private parties—be they 
the polluters responsible or unrelated third parties—have suc-
ceeded. Most of these funds cover only certain chemicals or 
metals. 
But lawmakers and agencies can, and should, create a re-
imbursement fund to cover urban agriculture. A successful 
fund would reimburse private parties that prime their land for 
agricultural purposes. Eligible expenditures could be pre-
approved, so as to minimize grift and ensure gardeners are re-
mediating in a cost-effective manner. The account could be lim-
ited in the capital it carries, and funded by taxes assessed on 
the urban farming community or general public in any number 
of ways. The program could sunset after a few years to allow its 
implementers to evaluate its worth and effectiveness. The 
small and limited nature of this regime is essential to its at-
tractiveness to governments in an economic downturn, even 
though healthy and functioning urban gardens have independ-
ent economic value. Regardless of the economy, the redevelop-
ment of toxic lands into sustainable urban gardens is uniformly 
a good thing. Policymakers should use the law to accomplish 
this goal by adopting a program with a proven track record of 
success in closely related contexts to urban soil remediation. 
 
